The Objective Standard Blog

Capitalism: The Only Moral Social System

Craig Biddle will be delivering his talk “Capitalism: The Only Moral Social System” at the following universities next week:

  • February 22, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Grainger Hall, Morgridge Auditorium (Room 1100) [map] 7:00pm
  • February 23, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Willey Hall, Room 125 [map] 7:30pm
  • February 24, Ohio State University, Wexner Center for the Arts, Performance Space [map] 6:00pm
  • February 25, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Physics Building, Room 204 [map] 7:00pm

Admission is FREE and open to the public.

Description: Capitalism is widely recognized as the practical social system because, wherever and to the extent that it is implemented, it leads to wealth and prosperity. But this same system is widely regarded as immoral because it enables people to act fully in their own self-interest—that is, to act on their own judgment and to keep, use, and dispose of the product of their own effort. In this talk, Mr. Biddle demonstrates why, far from making capitalism immoral, the fact that it enables everyone to act selfishly and own property is what makes it not only the most practical but also the only moral social system ever devised.

Image: Wiki Commons

Posted in: Announcements, Business and Economics, Events, Individual Rights and Law, Philosophy

The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

The Logical Leap: Induction in PhysicsPenguin has announced that July 6, 2010 is the official release date for David Harriman’s book, The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics.

Here’s the blurb from the back cover:

A groundbreaking solution to the problem of induction, based on Ayn Rand’s theory of concepts

Inspired by and expanding on a series of lectures by Leonard Peikoff, David Harriman presents a fascinating answer to the problem of induction—that is, the epistemological question of how we know the truth of inductive generalizations.

Ayn Rand presented her revolutionary theory of concepts in her book Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. As Dr. Peikoff subsequently explored inductive reasoning, he sought out David Harriman, a physicist who has taught philosophy, for his expert knowledge of the scientific discovery process.

Here, Harriman presents the result of collaboration between scientist and philosopher. Beginning with a detailed discussion of the role of mathematics and experiment in validating generalizations in physics—looking closely at the reasoning of scientists such as Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Lavoisier, and Maxwell—Harriman skillfully identifies the method by which we discover laws of nature. Refuting the skepticism that is epidemic in contemporary philosophy of science, Harriman offers demonstrable evidence of the power of reason. He then argues that philosophy itself is an inductive science—the science that teaches the scientist how to be scientific.

You can see the Table of Contents and First Pages at Falling Apple Science Institute, and you can preorder the book at Amazon.com. For a preview of Harriman’s work on this subject, see his TOS articles:

Posted in: Announcements, Philosophy, Science and Technology

Nothing Less than Victory: Now Available!

Nothing Less than VictoryJohn David Lewis’ new book, Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History, has been released and is now available for purchase. Congratulations Dr. Lewis!

For a taste of Dr. Lewis’ masterful analysis and writing, see his article "‘No Substitute for Victory’ The Defeat of Islamic Totalitarianism."

Posted in: Announcements, Foreign Policy and War

Altruism vs. America

[The following is an excerpt of from Craig Biddle’s article “The Creed of Sacrifice vs. The Land of Liberty.” Citations have been omitted here but are available in the article, which is accessible for free.]

The correlation between the morality of sacrifice and the violation of rights is no accident. It is a causal relationship. To see why, we must zero in on the little-understood essence of altruism.

Altruism is not about moral obligation as such; it is about a specific kind of moral obligation. Altruism does not call for a person to serve others if he has made an agreement or a commitment to do so—as in the case of a doctor who contracts to provide a patient with medical care in exchange for payment, or an employer who contracts to pay an employee in exchange for his work. Such obligations are chosen obligations, obligations stemming from mutually beneficial agreements, agreements in which both parties gain a life-serving value. Altruism is not about chosen obligations. It is about “unchosen” obligations or “duties.”

As the altruist philosopher John Rawls explains, whereas regular obligations “arise as a result of our voluntary acts,” duties “apply to us without regard to our voluntary acts.” We have a duty “to help another, whether or not we have committed ourselves to [doing so]. It is no defense or excuse to say that we have made no promise . . . to come to another’s aid.”

A “duty” is non-optional; it is something you must do regardless of what you want, regardless of what you think is in your interest, regardless of what you would choose to do if you had a choice in the matter. In the words of the foremost advocate of this idea, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, “duty is a necessitation to an unwillingly adopted end,” and its “specific mark” is “the renunciation of all interest.”

Altruism is the morality of “unchosen” obligations—obligations you must honor regardless of your values, desires, interests. This fact points to why altruism not only calls for self-sacrifice but also necessitates the initiation of physical force. British philosopher John Stuart Mill explains:

It is a part of the notion of duty in every one of its forms that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfill it. Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it may be exacted from him, we do not call it his duty. . . . There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to do. . . .

Observe what this means in regard to the relationship of “duties” and rights. Whereas a “duty” is an (alleged) obligation that one has apart from one’s choices or interests and that one “may rightfully be compelled to fulfill,” a right is a prerogative to act in accordance with one’s choices and interests so long as one does not violate the same rights of others. In other words, “duties” and rights are utterly incompatible. They are mutually exclusive. A person can have one or the other—but not both.

The French philosopher Auguste Comte (who coined the term “altruism”) puts this clearly: Because “to live for others” is “for all of us a constant duty” and “the definitive formula of human morality,” it follows that “[a]ll honest and sensible men, of whatever party, should agree, by a common consent, to eliminate the doctrine of rights.” Altruism, explained Comte, “cannot tolerate the notion of rights, for such notion rests on individualism.” On the premise of altruism, “[rights] are as absurd as they are immoral. . . . The whole notion, then, must be completely put away.”

The morality of altruism is incompatible with the principle of rights, and the theoreticians of altruism are clear on this point. In order to “completely put away” the concept of rights in America, however, the pushers of altruism will have to convince Americans to abandon their love of liberty—which is easier said than done.

Historically, Americans have been profoundly attached to liberty. Their country, after all, was founded on the right to liberty. They have even called their country the “Land of Liberty.” Putting away this principle will require persuading Americans to accept altruism fully, consistently, as a matter of principle. How do the opponents of rights propose to accomplish this goal? By taking their cue from John Stuart Mill, who explained precisely how to do it. “[T]he direct cultivation of altruism, and the subordination of egoism to it,” wrote Mill, “should be one of the chief aims of education, both individual and collective.”

Nor can any pains taken be too great, to form the habit, and develop the desire, of being useful to others and to the world . . . independently of reward and of every personal consideration. . . . [E]very person who lives by any useful work, should be habituated to regard himself not as an individual working for his private benefit, but as a public functionary; and his wages, of whatever sort, not as the remuneration or purchase-money of his labour, which should be given freely, but as the provision made by society to enable him to carry it on. . . .

American intellectuals and politicians have taken Mill’s advice. Over the past century, intellectuals have advocated altruism and condemned egoism at every turn. They have sought to habituate Americans to regard themselves not as individuals but as public functionaries. They have tried to sap the American spirit of individualism and to instill the altruistic spirit of collectivism. And they have done so to great effect. The American philosopher John Dewey, for instance, called for “saturating [students] with the spirit of service” and making “each one of our schools an embryonic community life, active with the types of occupations that reflect the life of the larger society.” To those who contend that schools should instead teach children the facts of history, science, literature, and the like, Dewey replied: “The mere absorbing of facts and truths is so exclusively individual an affair that it tends very naturally to pass into selfishness. There is no obvious social motive for the acquirement of mere learning, there is no clear social gain in success thereat.”

Dewey’s philosophy launched the “progressive education” movement, which has dominated American schools and saturated students with the spirit of service for almost a century. Given the wild success of this movement, is it any wonder that so many Americans today accept the propriety of sacrificial service to the community as an unquestionable absolute?

And while Dewey and company have focused on “educating” students for sacrificial service, other intellectuals—led by the American philosopher William James—have focused directly on forcing youth to do their “duty.”

James called for “a conscription of the whole youthful population,” which he appropriately called a “blood tax.” Contemporary political theorist Benjamin R. Barber advocates “a national service program, universal and mandatory.” And sociologist Charles Moskos explains that “[a]ny effective national service program will necessarily require coercion,” and he rebuffs those who “de-emphasize the role of the citizen duties in favor of a highly individualistic rights-based ethic.” We should, he says, “extend the concept of national youth service to include quasi-military civilian services . . . cast in terms of civic duty.”

Such educational and political efforts have given rise to an increasingly pliable citizenry, a steady stream of service-oriented legislation, and the establishment of numerous altruistically motivated institutions, from the Peace Corps, to Volunteers in Service to America (aka AmeriCorps), to Learn and Serve America, to the Corporation for National and Community Service, to the President’s Council on Service and Civic Participation, to the recent efforts by Congress and the Obama administration—which, if successful, will eclipse all preceding efforts combined.

The purpose of the $5.7 billion Serve America Act, recently passed by Congress and signed into law by Obama, is “to integrate service into education,” to encourage “many more Americans to give a year” of their lives, and to “increase service early in life” because “service early in life will put more and more youth on a path to a lifetime of service.” One advocate of the law hails it as the “quantum leap in community service that we’ve all been looking for.” Another exclaims: “The stars are aligned for national service.”

It seems that they are.

Following the lead of the state of Maryland—which, in 1993, became the first state in America to require community service as a condition of high school graduation—hundreds of school districts across America have established similar policies. And, today, pressure is growing not only for all students to be required to serve, but for everyone in general to be required to serve.

The Congressional Commission on Civic Service Act, a bill introduced on March 11, 2009, reads, in part: “The social fabric of the United States is stronger if individuals in the United States are committed to protecting and serving our Nation by utilizing national service and volunteerism.” The goal of this bill is, in part, to “improve the ability of individuals in the United States to serve others”; and, in part, to identify the “issues that deter volunteerism and national service, particularly among young people, and how the identified issues can be overcome.” Toward these ends, the bill calls for Congress to consider “[w]hether a workable, fair, and reasonable mandatory service requirement for all able young people could be developed,” and “[t]he effect on the Nation, on those who serve, and on the families of those who serve, if all individuals in the United States were expected to perform national service or were required to perform a certain amount of national service.”

Such is the state of the Land of Liberty today: The government is passing and enforcing an ever-increasing number of laws and regulations that violate our rights. It is nationalizing private corporations and nullifying private contracts. It is mandating community service for students and investigating the possibility of mandatory service for everyone. And—as if the foregoing were not enough to cause alarm—the government is now asking Americans to inform on fellow citizens who oppose the government’s statist measures.

On August 4, 2009, the following request was posted to the blog of the White House Briefing Room:

There is a lot of disinformation about health insurance reform out there, spanning from control of personal finances to end of life care. These rumors often travel just below the surface via chain emails or through casual conversation. Since we can’t keep track of all of them here at the White House, we’re asking for your help. If you get an email or see something on the web about health insurance reform that seems fishy, send it to flag@whitehouse.gov.

In light of all the evidence above—which barely scratches the surface of the mounting government power over the lives of Americans—the unavoidable conclusion is that the Land of Liberty is slipping down the slope to tyranny. The fundamental cause of this slide—the basic reason it is happening—is the widespread and increasing acceptance of the morality of altruism.

By accepting the morality of altruism, Americans accept the notion that they have a “duty” to serve “the common good”; and by accepting this “duty,” they thereby reject the basic principle of America: individual rights. The two are mutually exclusive. It is altruism or America. Indeed, it is altruism vs. America. And altruism is winning.

If Americans want to reverse this trend, they will have to challenge the creed of sacrifice at its root, which will require intellectual independence and substantial courage because the philosophic root of altruism is: religion. . . . [Read the whole article.]

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Posted in: Individual Rights and Law, Philosophy

2010 Summer Conference

Here’s an announcement from the Ayn Rand Institute:

Announcing Objectivist Summer Conference 2010!

We are pleased to introduce the Objectivist Summer Conference 2010 Web site. Objectivist Conferences is the premier venue for high-caliber presentations by Objectivist scholars, and that is what we bring you this year as Leonard Peikoff presents "The DIM Hypothesis" (part 2), the six-part sequel to the groundbreaking series of lectures that he delivered to our conference attendees in 2007. This year’s conference offers eleven general session lectures, sixteen optional courses, and a variety of social activities and special events.

In addition to Dr. Peikoff’s lectures, we will bring you lectures and courses on a broad spectrum of topics, including politics ("Defending Capitalism" by Yaron Brook); writing ("Writing Objectively" by Keith Lockitch); history ("The Renaissance [part 3]: Reformation and Religious Wars [1517-1648]," by Andrew Lewis); and poetry ("Making Poetry Part of Your Life," by Lisa VanDamme). We are also pleased to announce that there will be a special Q & A on ARI’s 25th Anniversary, hosted by Michael S. Berliner and Yaron Brook.

This year’s conference takes place in the exciting setting that only Las Vegas can provide. Besides the renowned glamour of the Vegas Strip, the area boasts excellent shopping and restaurants, and landmarks such as the Hoover Dam (subject of a general session lecture by Talbot Manvel).

We are looking forward to an inspiring and memorable conference—we hope to see you there!

Register by March 31 to take advantage of discount pricing. Details are available on our registration options and pricing page.

Note: For those who prefer to review details of Objectivist Summer Conference 2010 in print, we have made a printable PDF available online: PDF Catalog.

Posted in: Announcements, Ayn Rand and Objectivism, Events

TOS is now available via Kindle Magazine Subscription

Amazon.com has offered TOS in Kindle Book format (i.e., single issues) since last May, but they’ve not offered the journal via their highly exclusive Kindle Magazine program (i.e., via subscription), which currently includes only 48 periodicals. Today, however, Amazon added TOS to their Kindle Magazine lineup. Kindle owners, enjoy!

Posted in: Announcements

Virtue and the Realization of Human Life: Response to Roderick Long on Ayn Rand

In my last post, I responded to Will Wilkinson’s allegation that Ayn Rand’s ethical egoism cannot support the principle of individual rights, because the egoist has no self-interested reason to refrain from using force against others. Wilkinson contended that bureaucrats who feast at the public trough seem to fulfill their self-interest even though they live by force. In response, I asked whether they might be able to live a better, happier life by becoming producers rather than looters.

But many who read Ayn Rand’s works are troubled by Wilkinson’s question about why it is in the egoist’s self-interest to refrain from predation on others, and it is worth expanding on the answer. The question arises again in the series of posts from Cato Unbound that originally motivated Wilkinson’s comment. I want to briefly sketch an answer to one of these posts, by philosophy professor Roderick Long. Long also asks the question about how egoism supports rights, and offers an answer that he regards as superior to Rand’s. His position rests on a misunderstanding of Rand’s view on the relationship between means and ends.

To explain his answer to the predation problem, Long invokes a distinction from the history of ethics:

But what, in Rand’s view, connects our self-interest with the moral claims of others? For most of Rand’s aforementioned “eudaimonist” predecessors, the requirements of moral virtue were conceived as a constitutive part of the agent’s own interest; the Epicureans were the only major dissidents, regarding virtue instead as an instrumental strategy for attaining this interest (rather like Hobbes, in a way, though the Epicureans are surely closer to the main line of eudaimonism than Hobbes is). Rand appears to waver between these two approaches, treating the individual’s ultimate good sometimes as a robust human flourishing that has virtue as a component, and sometimes as mere survival to which virtue is only an external means.

Long sees this distinction as relevant to answering the predation problem because if we adopt the “constitutive” view rather than the “instrumental view,” and regard a man’s honesty and integrity as proper parts of his self-interest, then his being a man of honesty and integrity automatically contributes to his self-interest, whereas his use of force against others would contradict these virtues and automatically count against his self-interest. Long thinks that he sees elements of this “constitutive” view in Rand’s fiction:

The constitutive approach predominates in her novels; the chief reason that Rand’s fictional protagonists (such as architect Howard Roark in The Fountainhead or railroad executive Dagny Taggart in Atlas Shrugged) do not cheat their customers, for example, is pretty clearly that they would regard such parasitism on the productive efforts of others as directly inconsistent with the nobility and independence of spirit that they cherish for themselves, and not because they’re hoping that a policy of honesty will maximize their chances of longevity.

Long rightly stresses that elsewhere in her work, Rand urges that virtue is not an end in itself but a means to the end of human life. This suggests that she regarded virtue as “instrumental” to self-interest, rather than as a proper or constitutive part of it. But Long contends that this instrumental view of virtue is harder to square with an obligation to refrain from initiating force against others. If virtue consists of whatever achieves one’s self-interest, and self-interest is constituted only by generic material gain, then regularly mugging one’s neighbor would be virtuous. Long urges that we adopt the view that self-interest is constituted by virtue, but contends that Rand does not hold what he takes to be this more defensible view.

Long’s argument begins from a faulty assumption: that there is a firm distinction between the “instrumental” and the “constitutive” in value theory, that a means to an end cannot itself be part of the end.

Rand does regard the virtues as means, not as “ends in themselves.” But her point in rejecting the idea that virtue is “its own reward” is to distance her view from the altruistic view that severs the tie between virtue and the happy life. “Virtue is not its own reward or sacrificial fodder for the reward of evil. Life is the reward of virtue.” Her point is not necessarily to regard virtue as a mere means to an end—as if engaging in virtuous action were external to the end of life or as if virtuous action were not itself living.

Consider further that virtues are the principle-directed actions we must engage in to live a distinctive kind of life, a human life, which is itself constituted by distinctive types of values, values of both the body and the spirit. Life is an end in itself, and part of what this means is that living is both means and end, the means to more of itself. The question to answer, then, is what is this action of living?

In an underappreciated passage in “The Objectivist Ethics,” Rand makes this brilliantly clear:

Value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep—virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps it. The three cardinal values of the Objectivist ethics—the three values which, together, are the means to and the realization of one’s ultimate value, one’s own life—are: Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem, with their three corresponding virtues: Rationality, Productiveness, Pride (pg. 25). [my emphasis].

Reason, purpose, and self-esteem are the values that most crucially constitute the distinctively human way of living—as such they are both means to and part of the end. And the virtues are actions in service of these values.

Reason, purpose and self-esteem are the fundamental means to the ultimate end, which is human life. We need reason to identify the facts of reality that bear on solving the problem of survival, we need to identify the relationship of our actions and goals to our life and happiness—which is the value of purpose, and we need self-esteem to motivate these actions by reminding us that we are capable of succeeding in them and worthy of doing so.

The crucial nature of these cardinal values to a life of happiness is exhibited in Rand’s fiction when her characters are shown enjoying work, and enjoying it even when it is not a part of their chosen career. When Roark can’t find commissions, for example, he finds purpose in his life by working in the quarry. And when Dagny exiles herself from the railroad, she creates tasks for herself—like clearing brush and clearing paths—just because “what she needed was the motion to a purpose, no matter how small or in what form” (563).

Life itself is a process of action, and the actions that are central enough to an organism’s life are by that fact also essential parts of that organism’s distinctive form of life. Ayn Rand uses the language of “man’s survival qua man” to describe the distinctive virtues and values that compose a distinctively human life.

To draw a parallel: A plant’s distinctive life qua plant is more than its life qua a mass of cells; its life includes the way its cells are organized to interact with each other, to allow its leaves to reach toward the sun and its roots to burrow into the earth. Were a plant to be harvested and sliced into salad bits, many of its cells would still live, but the plant’s life qua plant would cease.

By the same token, a man’s distinctive form of life involves more than heartbeat and respiration, and more than walking and eating and reproducing. Distinctive to human life is the way our actions are organized and integrated by the operations of a rational mind. A man in a comatose state has lost this distinctive organizing principle. His cells and his brain stem may continue to function, but his is not man’s life qua man.

Being in a comatose state is not the only way to live a less than fully human life. When people fail to live lives of reason, purpose, and self-esteem, they may not exactly be vegetables, but they are not living the full, flourishing lives that they could. Wilkinson’s beltway bureaucrats, to the extent that they parasitize others, live “lives” of force rather than lives of reason, of the promiscuous “why not?” instead of the purposeful “what for?”, and of neurosis about whether they can maintain their ongoing parasitism, rather than self-esteem.

Which man lived a more confident, self-secure life: Thomas Edison, or Al Capone? Which man does a Rahm Emmanuel or a Timothy Geithner more closely resemble? And in our current situation, how long will either be able to maintain even the façade of the productive law-abiding citizen, rather than that of the gangster?

Images:
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Da_Vinci_Vitruve_Luc_Viatour.jpg
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Leonardo_Flowers.jpg

Posted in: Ayn Rand and Objectivism, Philosophy